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A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws
A National View
ROBERT P. LOWELL*
Usury is not a novel concept. References can be found in the
legal and religious annals of the last 2,500 years!' Nevertheless,
most modern legal practitioners probably have had little contact
with the subject of usury until the last several years. The current
money market has brought into focus the problem of legal limita-
tions on interest rates including, most importantly, the law of
usury.
Each of the fifty states (plus Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands
and the District of Columbia) has a usury law,2 and no two laws
are identical. Thus, in today's commerce, with many interstate
loan transactions, counsel may be called upon not only to deter-
mine which state law will apply, but also to understand the ap-
plicable law and, if possible, tailor the transaction so that the most
favorable law will be applied to the transaction. 3
* Partner, Sullivan, Marinos, Augustine & Delafield, San Diego, Cal-
ifornia. B.B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Stanford University.
The author wishes to thank Loren Weiss, a second-year Writer of the
San Diego Law Review, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Deuteronomry 23:16, Psalms XV; 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1561); Statute of Anne,
12 Anne, c. 16 (1713).
2. See Addendum infra.
3. The subject of conflict of law in respect to usury will not be covered
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Usury, simply stated, is charging more interest on a loan trans-
action than is allowed by law. Though the principle is relatively
simple, its application to the numerous types of transactions in
which usury may be involved is a difficult task. The purpose of
this article will be to summarize the law of usury as it has devel-




A reflection on the history of usury is important in order to give
the reader insight into the rationale and structure of modem usury
legislation, as well as to illustrate the tradition of the accompanying
public policy.
The doctrine of usury, being approximately 2,500 years old, had
its first recorded history in the Old Testament,4 where the ancient
laws forbade any interest against a brother, but permitted interest
against a stranger.5 Conversely, the economics of ancient Egypt
and the Roman Empire were not so concerned with the taking of
interest; and it was not until the reformation and the rise of Chris-
tianity that the Old Testament view again prevailed.6
The most recent usury statute adopted in England was the
Statute of Anne (1713).7 There, the maximum allowable rate was
set at 5 percent;8 and, furthermore, if the maximum rate was ex-
ceeded, with no exceptions, the contract was void.
The Statute of Anne remained in force in England for 141 years.
However, a change in public policy could be seen in 1830, when
holders in due course of securities were permitted recovery al-
though the securities arose out of a usurious transaction. Fi-
nally, in 1854, England repealed all usury legislation; 10 and since
that date, the courts have resorted merely to striking down uncon-
scionable contracts."
in this article. The broad dimensions of the subject are such that the sub-ject should be treated separately. For an excellent article, see Usury in the




6. 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1682, at 4754-55 (rev. ed. 1958) [here-
inafter cited as WMLLSTON]; 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1561).
7. 12 Anne, c. 16 (1713).
8. Id.
9. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 90 (1830).
10. Woolf v. Hamilton, 14 T.L.R. 499 (1830).
11. WILLisToN, supra note 6.
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The Statute of Anne, however, was the law in England during a
critical period in American history, and, in fact, is the model upon
which most American usury statutes are predicated. Although
the Statute of Anne was repealed in 1854, every state, plus Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia, have usury
legislation in some form.
II.
ELEmNTS OF USURY
Usury consists of three elements-(A) a loan or forbearance, (B)
exaction of excessive interest, and (C) wrongful intent. All ele-
ments must be present for usury to exist.
A. The Loan or Forbearance.
The typical usury law is based on the Statute of Anne12 and
provides that excessive interest may not be charged on "any loan
or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action."'1  Even
in jurisdictions broadening the definition of usury to include "all
written contracts whatsoever" providing for interest 14 or "any con-
tract founded upon any sale or loan of real or personal property,"' 5
the law requires that there be a debt obligation requiring the pay-
ment of interest.
Loan. A loan is defined as:
A contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and
the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that
which he borrowed.16
The essential element of any loan transaction is that it requires
the absolute commitment by the borrower to repay the principal
sum; the lender does not run any risk of loss of principal other
than as a result of the borrower's insolvency.' 7 The principle is
illustrated in a series of cases concerned with whether or not the
party obtaining the money had an absolute obligation to repay the
principal sum obtained.
12. 12 Anne, c. 16 (1713).
13. CAL. CONsT. art. XX, § 22 (1919).
14. 15 TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 5071 (Vernon 1962).
15. IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.4 (1962).
16. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1912 (West 1954).
17. Martin v. Ajax Construction Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 425, 269 P.2d 132
(1954).
In Martin v. Ajax Construction Co.,18 A advanced to B the sum
of $5,000 for the purpose of assisting B in undertaking a construc-
tion program to build 150 duplexes and 40 single-family residences.
A was to be repaid $10,000 within one year by the payment to him
of $100 upon the sale of each duplex and $50 upon the sale of each
single-family residence. The trial court was of the opinion that
there was no absolute obligation to repay the sum since the pri-
mary source of repayment was from the sales proceeds; the vari-
ous properties might not be sold or, if sold, might not result in suf-
ficient proceeds to pay the obligation, causing a loss of principal to
A. On that basis, the trial court found that a joint venture existed.
In reversing, the appellate court held that regardless of the pri-
mary source of funds for the payments of the obligation, there was
an unconditional promise to pay $10,000 within one year, and the
transaction constituted a loan. Therefore, the law of usury ap-
plied to the transaction.
Another case raising the same issue is Moore v. Dealy.1 9 There,
Reeves and Moore deposited the sum of $25,000 in a special account
to be withdrawn upon the joint signatures of Dealy and Reeves or
Moore. The moneys were to be used to pay certain construction
costs incurred by Dealy as contractor. In addition to recovering
$25,000, Reeves and Moore each were to be paid $5,000 for making
the moneys available. Although the contract stipulated that the
relationship was not a partnership or joint venture, the court found
that a joint venture existed; that an implied provision of the agree-
ment was that Reeves and Moore would share in the losses of the
enterprise. Since the transaction constituted a joint venture rather
than a loan, usury did not apply.
A third case raising the same issue is Wooton v. Coerber.20 In
that case, B entered into a transaction to buy property, but he had
no money with which to make the down payment. A put up all
the money as lender. A was to receive a limited share of the pro-
ceeds if the property was resold quickly; otherwise, A would ac-
quire ownership of the property if no sale could be made within
a reasonable time. The court found that the whole sum was put in
hazard, the sum being repaid in the last resort out of the property
itself. Therefore, the transaction was not a loan but was a joint
venture. In reaching its decision, the court was impressed with the
fact that A took all of the risk of financial loss.
The three cases just discussed raise the issue of whether the
18. Id.
19. 117 Cal. App. 2d 89, 254 P.2d 888 (1953).
20. 213 Cal. App. 2d 142, 28 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1963).
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transaction was a loan or a joint venture. In each of the three
cases, the court's rationale was based on whether the party fur-
nishing the financing was to bear any risk of loss of principal from
the operation of the debtor's business. In the Moore and Wooten
cases, the courts even ignored language in the documents referring
to the financial parties as lenders, and in each instance held the
transaction to be a joint venture.21
A similar issue is raised where a party purchases a debt obliga-
tion but the seller guarantees the purchaser against loss of princi-
pal. As an example, the seller may sell a debt obligation with re-
course. The usury laws do not generally apply to a true purchase
and sale transaction.22 However, if the seller guarantees the pur-
chaser against loss of principal, the court may be concerned that the
parties have created a loan transaction.
A typical case is Milana v. Credit Discount Co.23 There, the
plaintiff-manufacturer agreed to sell defendants her accounts re-
ceivable which she warranted to be good and collectible; in return,
the defendant-purchaser agreed to pay full face value, less agreed
upon discounts. The plaintiff's guarantee of principal was for a
specified time period, and defaulted accounts were charged by de-
fendants against reserves. The court found the transaction to be
merely an advancement of money to be repaid with interest at a
rate greater than allowed by law, and therefore it was usurious. 24
Although the presence of a guarantee does not in and of itself
mean that the transaction is a loan, its mere presence raises a red
flag, and in some cases where it is present, particularly where the
21. A similar principle appears to have been applied by the court in
Leibovici v. Rawloki, 57 Misc. 2d 141, 290 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1968). In that
case, A turned over to B the sum of $5,000. B guaranteed the return of
principal plus the first earnings of the property up to an amount per
annum equal to 10% of the investment (rate in excess of New York usury
limits). The court held that the contract was legal since it did not
constitute a loan. The contract concept before the court was developed in
the 13th and 14th centuries as a type of joint venture to escape the usury
laws. Without passing judgment on the importance of the case in New
York, outside that state it is doubted whether the decision of a lower court
would be followed.
22. See text accompanying note 135, infra.
23. 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945).
24. See Kelter v. American Bankers' Finance Co., 306 Pa. 483, 160 A.
127 (1932); Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916); Petition of
National Discount Co., 272 F. 570 (6th Cir. 1921).
parties have a continuing relation, the court is likely to find that
the transaction is a loan. In such cases, the only hazard to the
principal is the insolvency of the borrower.
Forbearance. A forbearance has been defined as the giving of fur-
ther time for the repayment of an obligation or an agreement not
to enforce a claim at its due date.25
The most common situation giving rise to a forbearance is illus-
trated by the case of London v. Toney.26 In that case, the debtor
could not pay his obligation upon its due date. Therefore, the
creditor agreed to extend the period of repayment of the debt
for an additional consideration. The new consideration, when
added to the interest provided for in the original contract, caused
the overall interest obligation to exceed the usury limitations of the
State of New York.
Suppose that the creditor agrees to waive personal liability in ex-
change for an additional consideration. The waiver of personal
liability has been held to be permanent forbearance, thus bringing
the transaction within the usury laws.27
B. Excessive Interest.
Excessive interest (usury's second element) has been broadly de-
fined as the exaction of a greater profit than is allowed by law for
the use of money or for the forbearance of a debt.28 An analysis of
interest and whether it exceeds the usury limit falls into five cate-
gories: (1) a technical definition of interest, (2) a description of
charges which normally are included within interest for purposes
of determining whether usury exists, (3) a description of charges
which normally are not included within interest, (4) a description
of the methods utilized to compute the rate of interest charged, and
(5) a description of certain loan transactions involving interest
charges outside the scope of usury.
1. A Technical Definition of Interest. In the words of California
Civil Code § 1915:
Interest is the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the par-
ties for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money.29
Thus, if the charge to the borrower is for any purpose other than
25. 1 B. WrImT, SuMMARY OF CALiFORimA LAW § 169, at 183-84 (7th ed.
1960).
26. 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934).
27. Calimpco v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950).
28. Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAWYER 181
(1960) (hereinafter cited as Prather].
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1915 (West 1954).
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for the use of money arising out of a loan or upon a forbearance
(or detention), it is not interest for the purpose of determining
usury.
One major line of cases in which the courts generally have found
the laws of usury not to apply pertains to the sale of credit. In
such cases, the courts have found that the charge to the obligor is
not for the use of money or for a forbearance but is for a sale of
credit to him by the obligee. The principal involved is set forth by
the court in Chakales v. Djiovanides.30 There, the court stated that
one may sell his credit to a borrower for a consideration, and to
that end may endorse, guarantee or become a surety for the pay-
ment of a loan made to the borrower by third persons at an interest
rate determined without regard to the usury laws; the arrangement
will not render usurious either the contract for the sale of credit
or the loan made by the third party.
The particular cases to be analyzed fall into two areas, namely,
(1) the guarantee and (2) the furnishing of credit and financing
for the benefit of the borrower.
The Guarantee. An agreement guaranteeing payment of a loan
is not usurious, regardless of the amount charged by the guarantor
for the loan of his credit (through his guarantee) for the reason
that the charge is not for the use of money or for a forbearance.
In White v. Anderson,3 1 plaintiff sold coupons to customers who
would use them in lieu of cash or other credit to purchase goods
from local merchants. The merchants accepted the coupons pur-
suant to an agreement with plaintiff and on presentment of the
coupons, plaintiff paid the respective merchant. Upon purchasing
the coupons, defendant signed a promissory note in favor of plain-
tiff for the full amount of the credit furnished plus five percent of
such amount. The five percent bonus was an absolute sum, and
there was no adjustment based on the period of time for which
credit was to be extended. Defendant contended that the charge
was usurious. On the other hand, plaintiff argued that he was do-
ing nothing more than furnishing his credit; thus, the transaction
was outside the scope of usury. The court found that the essential
nature of the transaction was not the guarantee or sale of credit
30. 161 Va. 48, 170 S.E. 848 (1933).
31. 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122 (1912).
but was a loan (evidenced by the promissory note). Therefore, the
transaction was usurious. The court pointed out:
The one important feature which the transaction lacks of being a
sale of credit, such as in the sale of a guaranty or endorsement, is
that in those instances there is no advance of money made by the
guarantor or endorser to or for the party guaranteed or endorsed
and he still owes the debt; while in this case there is an advance of
money for the defendant by the plaintiff in full discharge of his
debt and he does not owe anything to the merchant, but does owe
the plaintiff. When he gave plaintiff his note, ostensibly for cou-
pons, it was, in reality, for the money which plaintiff used in pay-
ing for his goods.32
In summary, a charge for a guarantee is not an interest charge
for the purpose of determining usury if the charge relates solely
to the providing of credit or security to the borrower; that is, the
charge is for furnishing credit and not for the use of the guaran-
tor's money. The money is obtained from a third party.3 3
Furnishing Credit and Financing. In the second group of cases,
one party furnishes his credit to a second party to assist the second
party in acquiring goods from a third party. Courts have distin-
guished these cases on the theory that the charges made are for
the sale (or furnishing) of credit, rather than for a loan, and thus
are not interest charges for purposes of determining usury.
A frequently cited case is Oil City Motor Company v. C.I.T. Cor-
poration,3 4 a decision based on Oklahoma law. In that case, plain-
tiff was an auto dealer selling cars at retail upon terms other than
cash. Since that method of operation required more cash than
plaintiff had available, plaintiff entered into a Floor Plan agree-
ment with defendant. Under the plan, plaintiff would draw sight
drafts on defendant to pay for new vehicles purchased from the
manufacturer. Prior to shipping of the automobiles to plaintiff,
the manufacturer would deliver the trust receipt and draft to de-
fendant in Detroit who then paid the amount of the draft to the
manufacturer. Upon receipt of the car, plaintiff reimbursed de-
fendant for 10 percent of the purchase price and gave to defendant
plaintiff's 90-day accepted draft for the balance. The court found
that defendant lent or extended its credit which plaintiff used in
the operation of its business; the consequent charge to plaintiff was
for the extension of credit, as distinguished from a loan. Thus, the
court held that the transaction did not constitute a loan of money,
and there was no usury.
32. Id. at 138, 147 S.W. at 1124.
33. GMAC v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924); Grannis v.
Temple, 84 Misc. 415, 146 N.Y.S. 239 (1914).
34. 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935).
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A second case involving the same issue is Klett v. Security Ac-
ceptance Company.35  There, defendant furnished trust receipt
financing to plaintiff in an amount equal to 90 percent of the
manufacturer's sales price for furniture inventory acquired by
plaintiff. Defendant would pay for the furniture, and upon its de-
livery to plaintiff, plaintiff would execute a trust receipt, acknowl-
edging that he was holding title to the furniture in trust for defend-
ant and that the furniture could only be released from the trust
upon payment in cash for it. Ordinarily, the inventory remained
subject to the trust receipt until it was sold by plaintiff. How-
ever, if defendant repossessed the furniture and sold it to satisfy
the debt, any surplus from the sale would be the property of the
Trustee (plaintiff); a deficiency, if any, would be paid by plaintiff
to defendant. For the financing described above, defendant
charged to plaintiff a charge of I percent per month for the total
financing furnished during that month. The court held that the
monthly charge was for the furnishing of financing, not for a loan
or forbearance, and thus did not constitute interest for purposes of
determining usury.
The court in Klett distinguishes the Oil City Motor Company
case, indicating that the latter was excluded from the usury laws
because it was based upon an extension of credit and not a loan.3 6
The court indicated that the K!ett transaction was excluded from
the usury laws because the charge by the defendant was for the
financing arrangement (that is, furnishing financing), not for a
loan. The argument certainly seems to create a distinction with-
out a difference. The financing arrangements in the two cases were
very similar, and to the extent that the theory excluding those
cases from the usury law is sound, it is because the obligee fur-
nished (or sold) its credit to the obligor.
A very recent case in California has placed the status of the
problem in doubt. In Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp.,37 defendant
used his credit to acquire certain personal property for plaintiff
who could not otherwise obtain the credit. Defendant borrowed
the money from Union Bank, purchased equipment and leased it
35. 38 Cal. 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952).
36. Id. at 783, 242 P.2d at 882.
37. Civil No. 32067 (2nd Dist. Court of App., Dec. 13, 1968), 74 Cal.
Rptr. 141 (1968).
to plaintiff. Pursuant to the agreement with the bank, defendant
also was obligated to repay the loan. Plaintiff gave a trust receipt
for the equipment to the bank. The appellate court found that the
entire transaction was a financing arrangement, not a loan, and in
reliance on the Klett decision ruled that the charges by defendant,
although in excess of 10 percent per annum, were not interest within
the scope of the usury statute.38
However, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower ap-
pellate court decision in Burr,3 9 holding that the lease arrangement,
in fact, constituted a loan from defendant to plaintiff and the usury
laws applied. Most important, the supreme court in its decision
completely ignored the argument that the interest was paid other
than for a loan or forbearance. Thus, at the present time in Cali-
fornia, if flooring or similar financing is furnished, the issue is in
doubt as to whether charges for such financing are interest within
the scope of the usury laws.
Regardless of the arguments used by the courts in the Oil City
Motor Company and Klett cases, and the lower appellate court in
the Burr case, there appears to be a serious question of whether
charges under those cases should be outside the scope of usury. In
all three cases, there was a debtor-creditor (loan) transaction be-
tween the parties as of the moment the debtor took possession of
the goods purchased. The utilization of trust receipts in all three
cases merely furnished security to the party actually advancing the
purchase money. And the primary obligation in all three cases
was to the person furnishing the credit. The situation does not
appear to be unlike that in White v. Anderson o where the person
furnishing credit (through the sale of coupons) also took back a
promissory note from each purchaser of the coupons. There, the
court found that the charge to the purchaser was upon the ac-
companying promissory note (loan) and applied the usury law.
The situation in the above cases is significantly different than the
guarantee cases where the guarantor did not furnish the money
but merely furnished his credit as surety.
2. Charges Included Within Interest.
Generally, any compensation, remuneration or other benefit ex-
acted by a lender as a part of a loan (or forbearance) transac-
tion is interest.4 1 The imagination of lenders has caused such
38. Id.
39. Burr v. Capital Reserve Corp., 71 Cal. 2d 983, 80 Cal. Rptr. 345,
458 P.2d 185 (1969).
40. 164 Mo. App. 132, 147 S.W. 1122 (1912).
41. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1915 (West 1954).
Usury Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
benefits to take many different forms, undoubtedly due (in part)
to the presence of the usury laws and apparent attempts to avoid
the limitations of such laws.
Perhaps the best approach to defining interest is to state gener-
ally what charges or benefits are not interest for purposes of de-
termining usury. In most states, payments by the borrower to or
for the benefit of the lender of reasonable expenses incidental to
the loan and as consideration for it are not interest charges.42 All
other benefits paid to the lender or accrued or applied for his bene-
fit will be interest.4
3
In 1967, the State of Maryland adopted a different approach in
determining what is interest.44 If a fee or charge is retained by
the lender, whether or not it was for an expense incurred in respect
to the loan, it is interest. Only if the lender is a mere conduit, col-
lecting money to pay independent and unrelated parties, will the
fee not be interest.45
In comparing the two approaches, it appears that the major con-
flict pertains to the treatment of internal expenses of the lender,
for example, charges for house counsel or an in house appraiser.
Under the Maryland approach, 46 if these charges are retained by
the lender, they are interest. If similar specific charges are re-
tained by lenders in other states, it is possible that the charges may
not be deemed interest.
Even in the great majority of states where reimbursement of in-
ternal expenses is not per se interest, it is far easier for the court to
justify such charges if the borrower had full knowledge of the facts
and agreed in advance to the payment.47 Furthermore, reimburse-
42. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 (1927);
Klett v. Security Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952);
Silver Homes, Inc. v. Marx & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361, 333 S.W.2d 810(1960).
43. Mong v. Bass, 248 Cal. App. 2d 377, 56 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967); Char-
lotte Guyer and Associates v. Franklin Factors, 211 Cal. App. 2d 690, 27
Cal. Rptr. 575 (1963).
44. ANN. CODE or MD. art. 49, § 1(a) (b) (Supp. I, 1969) amending ANN.
CODE OF MAD. art. 49, § 1 (Replacement Vol. 1968).
45. B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d
591 (1968).
46. Id.
47. Rossberg v. Holesapple, 128 Utah 544, 260 P.2d 563 (1953). The court
held that the reimbursement of travel expenses incurred by the lender in
ment must be for specific expenses. A charge to compensate the
lender for a portion of his overhead has been generally held to be
an additional interest charge43
Interest most frequently is defined by that term in the debt in-
strument. However, interest also generally includes points, bon-
uses, commissions, and origination and closing fees paid to or for the
benefit of the lender, to the extent that any such payments do not
constitute reimbursement of expenses which the borrower has
agreed to pay.49
The issue of what is interest can best be summarized by reference
to two California cases. In the case of In re Fuller0 the court held
that the usury law operates only as a limitation upon the interest
which a lender may charge and does not exclude, regulate or limit
legitimate expenses or service charges that may be borne by the
borrower when incurred in connection with the loan transaction.
In the case of Mong v. Bass,51 the lender had attempted to recover
a documentary charge of $25.00 per month for each car upon which
the lender had furnished trust receipt financing. The court also
found that the particular charge was not related to a specific re-
coverable expenditure, stating:
The record here supports the determination that the $25 was a
general charge not attributable to any particular service. The ex-
penses which plaintiff has described are a part of the necessary
cost of doing business by anyone who is engaged in automobile fi-
nancing. A lender who makes a flat charge in excess of the legal
rate of interest may not defend a usury charge merely by showing
that he had some business expenses which reduced his net profit
to a figure within the legal rate of interest.52
Commissions. A particular problem arises in determining wheth-
er the commission paid by the borrower to the lender or to an
agent is interest to the lender. Clearly, a commission paid directly
to the lender is interest.58 However, whether a commission paid to
an agent is included within the interest income attributable to the
lender generally depends upon whether the agent was acting for the
investigating the loan application constituted "interest" since reimburse-
ment had not been agreed upon in the loan application agreement.
48. Vee Bee Service Co. v. Household Finance Corp., - Misc. 2d -
51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affd mem. 269 App. Div. 772, 55 N.Y.S.2d
570 (1945); Gangadean v. Flori Investment Co., 11 Ariz. App. 512, 466 P.2d
63 (1970).
49. B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d
591 (1968).
50. 15 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 102 P.2d 321, 329-31 (1940).
51. 248 Cal. App. 2d 377, 56 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1957).
52. Id. at 383-84, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
53. Wheeler v. Superior Mortgage Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 246, 325 P.2d 156(1958).
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lender or for the borrower.
An illustrative case is Clarke v. Hornay." In that case, the
lender employed an agent to renegotiate an existing loan. The
new agreement was executed establishing a loan in the amount of
$23,000, bearing interest at the rate of ten percent per annum, all
due and payable in eight months. The borrower was required to
pay a $4,000 commission to the lender's agent for negotiating the
loan. The court held that the loan was usurious, pointing out that:
"the exaction of a commission from the borrower by the lender's
agent will render the transaction usurious on the facts described if
such exaction is known to and authorized or ratified by the
lender."' ,5 In adding the agent's commission to the lender's inter-
est, the court reasoned that the borrower was paying the lender's
obligation; thus, the benefit derived constituted additional interest
income to the lender.
Suppose, however, that the lender's agent obtains the commis-
sion, without the knowledge or consent of the lender. A review of
the cases in that instance indicates that in a majority of jurisdic-
tions, the commission is not deemed a part of the lender's interest.5
6
Suppose that the commission is paid by the borrower to his own
agent. Under those circumstances, generally the commission is not
an interest charge.57 As the court pointed out in Altschul v. Mar-
tin,58 the decisive question is one of agency. The court stated:
It is settled by our decisions that if such a broker is the borrower's
agent his fee is not treated as interest on the loan, but the rule is
otherwise if the broker is the lender's agent.59
Suppose that the borrower's agent, in order to obtain a loan,
agrees to split his commission with the lender, thus providing an
additional benefit to the lender. Generally, the share received by
the lender is deemed additional interest to the lender for purposes
of determining whether usury exists.6 0 However, in Pushee v.
54. 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963).
55. Id. at 310, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 903, quoting Penziner v. West American
Finance Co., 133 Cal. App. 578, 589, 24 P.2d 501, 506 (1933).
56. Harrell, Mortgage Investments and the Usury Problem, 10 CLEV.-
MWUi. L. REv. 343 (1961).
57. Klein v. Mathewson, 384 Pa. 298, 121 A.2d 577 (1956).
58. 227 Ark. 816, 301 S.W.2d 571 (1957).
59. Id. at 818, 301 S.W.2d at 573.
60. Jones v. Philippe, 135 Ark. 578, 206 S.W. 40 (1918).
Johnson,6 the Florida Supreme Court held that where the agent
and the lender had no pre-arranged plan and the burden on the
borrower is not increased, the lender's share of the commission did
not constitute interest for purposes of the usury statute. The court
reasoned that under the circumstances, the sharing of the commis-
sion served a useful purpose (inducing the loan) .62
Other Charges Found to be Interest. In the portion of this article
entitled "Special Situations",6 a number of different types of trans-
actions are discussed which raise the issue of whether the lender
(if a loan is involved) has derived a benefit which may not appear
to be interest on the face of the loan documents or whether the
lender has derived a benefit out of a collateral transaction. Under
certain circumstances, the additional benefit will be construed as
interest for purposes of determining usury.
3. Charges Not Included Within Interest.
Earlier in this article, there was discussed the particular types of
benefits which may be interest. It was pointed out that any com-
pensation, remuneration or other benefit exacted by the lender
will be deemed interest unless the charge is to reimburse or com-
pensate the lender for a specific expenditure or service which he is
entitled to recover without it being considered interest. In Klett
v. Security Acceptance Co.,6 4 the California Supreme Court stated
the rule to be as follows. In order for the charge not to be consid-
ered interest, it:
[MIust be confined to a specific service or expense incidental to the
loan incurred in such a way as to preclude it being a device
through which additional interest or profit on the loan may be
exacted.65
Not only must the charge be related to a specific service, but as a
general rule it also must be reasonable in amount in relation to
the actual services rendered incidental to procuring the loan. Gen-
erally, courts also will be concerned with whether the borrower
gave his prior consent and agreement to compensate the lender for
the particular expenses.6
Generally, to assist the lender in recovering expenses without
such recovery being deemed interest, the following four rules
should be followed. First, where possible, the lender should at-
61. 123 Fla. 305, 166 So. 847 (1936).
62. Accord, Patterson v. Blomberg, 196 N.C. 433, 146 S.E. 66 (1929).
63. See text accompanying notes 166-76, infra.
64. 38 Cal. 2d 770, 242 P.2d 873 (1952).
65. Id. at 787-88, 242 P.2d at 884.
66. For a general discussion, see § 11:5 Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1391 (1963).
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tribute and relate the fee to an actual out-of-pocket expense inci-
dental to the loan. Secondly, the charge should be classified and
defined according to some service or expense commonly used and
accepted in the lending community for services related to obtaining
a loan.6 7 Thirdly, the expense should be reasonable in relation to
the service rendered. Fourthly, the borrower, where possible,
should agree in advance to the payment of the expense.
With the above general considerations in mind, specific categories
of charges related to loans normally not deemed interest will be
reviewed.
Loan Origination and Closing Expenses. Loan origination and
closing expenses generally are those costs incurred by the lender
in investigating, making, and consummating the particular loan.
Examples of such charges are: appraisal fees, title examination
costs, title insurance, attorney's fees, costs of preparing loan docu-
ments, escrow fees and recording fees. To the extent that charges
to the borrower meet the four rules previously stated, the charges
herein described should not be interest for purposes of determining
usury.
Under circumstances of the particular cases, the following
charges have been found to be legitimate expenses, not included
within interest.
1. A property inspection fee to reimburse the lender
for its expenses in inspecting the property.68
2. Title examination fees and traveling expenses paid to
an independent attorney and inspector designated by the
lender.6 9
3. FHA insurance premium. 0
4. Charges for Mechanic's Lien insurance (premium re-
tained by the lender who was to issue the insurance) and
67. Ideally, the category of expense is one where the courts have deter-
mined that the charge may be passed on to the borrower without it
being classified as "interest".
68. Winston v. Personal Finance Co. of Pine Bluff, 220 Ark. 580, 249
S.W.2d 315 (1952).
69. Mathews v. Georgia State Savings Association, 132 Ark. 219, 200
S.W. 130 (1918).
70. Silver Homes, Inc. v. Mark & Bensdorf, Inc., 206 Tenn. 361, 333 S.W.
2d 810 (1960).
completion insurance.71
5. Broker's fee or other compensation paid to a third
person and appraisals, recording fees and insurance
charges.72
6. A charge for supplying supervision during the course
of construction if the charge bears a reasonable relation to
the cost normally of such charges.
73
Expenses During Term of Loan. The lender is entitled to recover
for reasonable expenses incurred during the course of the loan
(for example, inspection and disbursement expenses incurred dur-
ing construction) and it may be possible to exact such expenses in
advance.74 Ideally, of course, the payment of such charges for fu-
ture services should be agreed upon at the time the loan is nego-
tiated.
Charges Payable by Borrower Upon Default. Charges payable
by the borrower upon default would include a reasonable default
charge, foreclosure and title costs and attorney's fees incurred by
the lender. The prevailing rule in most jurisdictions is that such
charges are not interest within the meaning of the usury statute
since the incurrence of the expense is within the control of the
borrower.75
In the case of Abbot v. Stevens,76 the California court (in deal-
ing with the related issue of prepayment penalties), stated that
where the charge is under the borrower's control, its payment by
the borrower does not make the transaction usurious. And in an-
other California case, the court held that attorney's fees incurred by
the trustee and beneficiary of the deed of trust prior to its fore-
closure is a legitimate expense chargeable to the borrower and is
not interest within the meaning of the usury statute. 77
A case dealing particularly with the late charge is Camilla Cotton
71. Hance Hardware Co. v. Denbigh Hall, Inc., 17 Del. Ch. 234, 152 A.
130 (1930).
72. In re Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 102 P.2d 321, 330 (1940); but see
limitations discussed on brokers' and agents' fees paid in a manner to
benefit the lender. See text accompanying notes 53-62, infra.
73. Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 448 P.2d 859 (1968);
Modern Pioneers Insurance Co. v. Nordin, 103 Ariz. 125, 437 P.2d 658 (1968).
74. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 618-19, 254 P. 956,
965-66 (1927); Klett v. Security Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. 2d 770, 787-88,
242 P.2d 873, 890-91 (1952).
75. Prather, supra note 28.
76. 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955).
77. Penziner v. West American Finance Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 180-81, 74
P.2d 253, 272-73 (1937).
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Oil Company v. Spencer Kellog and Sons, Inc.78 There, the plain-
tiff brought an action under Georgia law to recover the balance due
on a promissory note. The lender included in its complaint a claim
for late charges based upon a provision in the promissory note
which read as follows:
If for any reason any of said payments are not made promptly on
the date due, a late charge of five cents per $1.00 of the payment in
default will be made and shall be added to the annual payment
when paid .... 79
The court held that the charge is solely within the control of the
borrower, there being no late charge if the loan payments had been
paid when due. Therefore, the loan was not usurious.
Prepayment Penalties. Frequently, the loan agreement provides
that if the borrower elects to prepay a portion or all of the princi-
pal obligation, he must pay a premium or penalty. The courts gen-
erally have held that such charges are not interest for purposes of
determining usury, justifying the results upon two theories. First,
since the contingency is solely within the control of the borrower
(in the absence of coercion by the lender), the penalty is not in-
terest for purposes of determining usury.8 0 Secondly, other courts
have reasoned that the charge is not for the use or forbearance of
money but is for the privilege of terminating the indebtedness and
the obligation to pay interest.8 1
Commitment Fees. Cases interpreting commitment fees and the
legal theories which create the obligations of the parties to perform
under a commitment fee agreement vary widely.8 2 Nevertheless,
it appears that if a true commitment fee is involved, the charge is
not for the use of money and thus is not interest for purposes of de-
termining usury. 3
78. 257 F.2d 162 (Sth Cir. 1958).
79. Id. at 163 n.2.
80. Abbot v. Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955); Glu-
shorn, The California Usury Law: The Lender's Trap and the Borrower's
Windfall, 43 J. STATE BAR CAL. 56 (1968).
81. See Webb v. Southern Trust, 227 Ky. 79, 11 So. 2d 988 (1928); Lyons
v. National Savings Bank, 280 App. Div. 339, 113 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1952);
Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 54 A.2d 641 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1947); Feld-
man v. Kings Hwy., 278 App. Div. 589, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1951); McCarty v.
Mellinkoff, 118 Cal. App. 11, 4 P.2d 595 (1931).
82. Wolf, The Refundable Commitment Fee, 23 Bus. LAWYER 1065 (1968).
83. Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Savings & Trust Co., 88 Ind. App. 222,
An excellent description of the commitment fee and the applica-
tion of the usury laws generally is found in The Business Lawyer8 4
wherein it is stated:
The commitment fee buys a commitment; the fee paid is not "for
the use of money," but for the privilege later of actually borrowing
the money. It is an option, not a loan. There is a risk involved to
the lender for which it is equitable that he be paid. In committing
to lend money in the future, the lender is taking a risk that the
yield, rate committed for, and security terms will not be less fa-
vorable at the time the loan actually is made than at the time of the
commitment. Most certainly if the committed loan never is made,
no question of usury could be raised. Indeed, this demonstrates
even more clearly that the prospective borrower has bought some-
thing other than money, namely, the right to secure a loan of money
if he later decides he wants it. In some instances mortgage lenders
choose to refund the commitment fee if the loan actually is made.
If this is done, of course, there could be no involvement with the
usury laws, at least with respect to the fee .... 85
Suppose, however, that the lender attempts to exact an unusually
high commitment fee as a means of obtaining an additional profit
on his loan in the event the loan is made. Two recent cases shed
considerable light on whether (under those circumstances) the fee
will be deemed interest for determining if usury exists.
In the first case, D & M Dev. Co. v. Sherwood and Roberts, Inc., 6
defendant Sherwood and Roberts, Inc., entered into an agreement
with the prospective borrower (D & M Dev. Co.) to make or obtain
three commitments for loans in respect to a shopping center de-
velopment as follows: (1) a land loan for $306,000; (2) an interim
construction loan for $1,650,000; and (3) a permanent loan for
$1,650,000. In exchange for obtaining the commitments, the de-
veloper paid a commitment fee of $56,250. The developer obtained
the land loan but did not utilize either of the other loans because
it had obtained more favorable loans elsewhere.
The developer then sued Sherwood and Roberts, Inc., claiming
that the commitment fee constituted interest which made the total
interest charge on the land loan usurious. The court held that the
fee was not interest, indicating that a commitment fee is not "for
the use of money" but for the privilege (option) of later actually
obtaining the loan. The court indicated that the purpose of the
commitment is to transfer the risk of the money market from the
borrower to the lender; however, the fee must be reasonable and
not out of line with the going rate within the commercial com-
162 N.E. 27 (1928); Paley v. Barton Savings and Loan Association, 82
N.J. Super. 72, 196 A.2d 682 (1964).
84. Prather, supra note 28.
85. Id. at 188.
86. 93 Idaho 200, 457 P.2d 439 (1969).
Usury Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
munity. By its decision, the court ruled that unreasonable compen-
sation for the commitment could constitute an extra interest pay-
ment on the accompanying loan for the purposes of determining
usury.
The second recent case in respect to commitment fees was Altherr
v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp.8 7 In that case, the court in dictum in-
dicated that a reasonable commitment fee is not interest; how-
ever, an unreasonable commitment fee can be a cloak for usury.
The court stated that the reasonableness of the fee requires an ad
hoc approach. Pertinent factors are: the tightness or looseness of
money, the amount of the fee and the rates prevailing in the money
market where the lender might keep his funds while waiting for
the borrower to call for the loan And what would be a reasonable
fee at one time might be an unreasonable fee at another.
In summary, a reasonable commitment fee is not a charge for the
use of money but for the commitment to obtain a loan in the fu-
ture; thus, it is not an interest charge for purposes of determining
if usury exists. The test of whether the fee is reasonable is ex-
plained in the Altherr case.
Builder's Payment. Suppose that the builder makes a payment
to the lending institution to obtain a loan for a prospective pur-
chaser. Probably the payment will not be construed as interest
since it is not made strictly for a loan or forbearance but is made to
obtain a commitment.8 8
4. A Description of the Methods Utilized to Compute Interest.
After the various items of interest have been ascertained, it must
be determined whether the lender's charges are usurious. That
is, does the total interest to be earned exceed the legal limits of
the applicable usury statute?
The general formula for determining whether usury exists was
set forth by the court in Penziner v. West American Finance Co.8 9
There the court first computed the actual profit (that is, interest)
paid to the lender. The court next determined the maximum
amount which the lender was permitted to charge pursuant to the
87. 104 Ariz. 59, 448 P.2d 859 (1968).
88. Prather, supra note 28; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 531 (1932).
89. 10 Cal. 2d 1960, 74 P.2d 252 (1937).
usury law over the actual life of the loan. Since the actual interest
charged exceeded the legal maximum amount allowed, the loan
was usurious.
In applying the general formula described above, a number of
special problems may arise. Certain special problems will be dis-
cussed below.
Compounding Interest. Interest at the maximum rate allowed
by law may be compounded no more frequently than annually.9 0
And, keep in mind that interest is not compounded unless com-
pounding is expressly provided for.9 1
Points, Discounts, Bonuses and Interest in Advance. Points, dis-
counts and bonuses constitute interest unless the charge is sup-
ported by an expense which the law allows the lender to pass on to
the borrower. In almost all instances it is the practice of lenders
to deduct such charge from the loan proceeds prior to disburse-
ment of the proceeds to the borrower.
The courts generally have followed the rule that interest taken
in advance (including points, discounts and bonuses to the extent
that they constitute interest) shall be deducted from the face
amount of the loan to determine the net proceeds. Interest for
purposes of the usury statute is computed on the net proceeds.92
The decisions are split on the issue of whether the taking of
interest in advance at the maximum rate constitutes usury. In
some jurisdictions, the usury statute will indicate that interest
taken in advance for not longer than the first year will not be
deducted from the face of the loan to determine net proceeds. In
other jurisdictions, the courts have condoned the practice because
of the custom and practice in the banking community, and the
courts will not discriminate between banks and other creditors.98
In some jurisdictions, where interest at the maximum rate was
payable quarterly or monthly in advance, it was held to be usur-
ious.94 However, if the borrower voluntarily pays the interest in
advance for reasons other than contractual compulsion there is no
usury.9 5
90. Heald v. Friis-Hansen, 52 Cal. 2d 834, 839, 345 P.2d 457, 461 (1959);
Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 616, 254 P. 956, 958
(1927).
91. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 616, 254 P. 956, 958(1927).
92. Devers v. Greenwood, 139 Cal. App. 2d 345, 293 P.2d 834 (1956).
93. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 630, 657 (1958).
94. Purvis v. Frink, 57 Fla. 519, 49 So. 1023 (1909); Paillet v. Wroman,
52 Cal. App. 2d 297, 126 P.2d 419 (1942); Taylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 18
P.2d 333 (1933).
95. 79 Ariz. 381, 290 P.d 735 (1955).
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The courts generally require that discounts, points, bonuses and
loan charges (which are deemed to be interest but are deducted in
advance) to be amortized over the life of the loan for the purposes
of determining usury.96
Computation on the Net Proceeds. The principle (discussed
above) that interest is to be computed on the net funds made avail-
able to the borrower relates to two other lending practices; namely,
(1) the wrap-around or all-inclusive loan and (2) compensating
balances.
The first example of computing interest on the net funds made
available pertains to the wrap-around or all-inclusive loan. To
illustrate, suppose the owner of property elects to borrow money in
the sum of $20,000, using the property as security for the loan. The
property already is encumbered wth a first trust deed or mortgage
,securing a note with an unpaid balance of $10,000 which is on ad-
vantageous terms and which the owner would like to preserve. He
obtains a new lender who will make an all-inclusive loan. The
new lender advances the sum of $20,000 but takes back a promis-
sory note in the sum of $30,000. As a part of the transaction, the
new lender agrees to make the debt-service payments on the
$10,000 obligation. The advantage to the new lender is that he will
charge interest on the full $30,000. The advantage to the borrower
is that he will preserve the advantageous existing financing.
The principle is illustrated in the case of Mindlin v. Davis.
97
There, the plaintiff owned property encumbered by a mortgage
note of $1,488. Defendant loaned plaintiff $3,300; however, defend-
ant retained $1,488 with which he agreed to pay off the mortgage
note. Defendant failed to pay off the mortgage note, but instead
made the required debt service payments on it. The interest rate
charged on the loan was not usurious if computed on the $3,300, but
if it was computed on the net funds made available to plaintiff
($1,812), it clearly was usurious. The Florida court held that the
loan was usurious since interest is computed on the net funds made
available to plaintiff.98
96. Brown v. Cardoza, 67 Cal. App. 2d 187, 192, 153 P.2d 767, 769-70
(1944); B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d
591 (1968).
97. 78 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
98. Id. On the other hand, the lender might argue that the assumption
In Mindlin, the borrower did not consent to the manner in which
the lender elected to pay off the principal of the prior indebtedness.
In the normal wrap-around loan, the borrower has consented to the
overall plan of payment. Regardless of that distinction, however,
the rule of the case is well taken. There appears to be no case deal-
ing with the application of usury to the wrap-around loan since
the Mindlin decision.
The second example of computing interest on net funds made
available pertains to compensating balances. On occasion, a lender
will require a portion of the loan funds (or other funds) to be
placed or retained in a bank account in a manner to derive a par-
ticular benefit for the lender. Suppose (at the same time) the
lender is earning interest at the maximum legal rate on the particu-
lar loan.
The Restatement of Contracts"0 indicates that if the lender re-
quires a compensating balance (upon which no interest is paid)
and it is maintained on the terms described above, the loan is usuri-
ous for the reason that the lender has obtained an advantage from
the collateral bargain for which he gives no equivalent.100
The case of Planters' National Bank of Virginia v. Wysong &
Miles Co.,1'0 supports the Restatement position. There, plaintiff
bank made a loan with the understanding and agreement that it
would retain twenty percent of the amount loaned as a deposit of
the defendant borrower in the bank. The deposit was not subject
to withdrawal by the borrower but was held in a general account
in its name. At the same time, plaintiff bank charged interest at
the maximum legal rate on the total loan. The court found that
the transaction was usurious, the lender having derived a gain in
excess of that allowed by law.
A second case in point is Vee Bee Service Co. v. Household Fi-
nance Corp. 0 2 There, the lending bank caused five percent of the
loan to be set aside as security for risk of loss due to nonpayment.
Interest computed on the net funds made available exceeded the
statutory limit. The court stated: "The risk of nonpayment is in-
herent in every loan and may be compensated for only out of the
of the underlying first mortgage is a consideration which is either a part
of or independent of the transaction and sufficient to support the addi-
tional interest charge.
99. RESTA Tsun OF CONTRACTS, Explanatory Note 2, § 528 (1932).
100. Suppose, however, that the normal interest rate payable at the bank
to its customers is paid on the compensating balance. Such payment
might alter the results.
101. 177 N.C. 380, 99 S.E. 199 (1919).
102. 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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statutory interest allowed."'1 3 The court pointed out that interest
is the compensation for (1) the inconvenience of parting with prin-
cipal and (2) the hazard of losing principal. Loss of principal
through the insolvency of the borrower is the ordinary risk for
which the lender is compensated by the payment of interest. It is
not a risk that justifies interest beyond the legal limit. The court
then went on to hold that the lender cannot charge the legal maxi-
mum interest rate on the full amount of the loan where it requires
that a portion of the loan proceeds remain in its possession as secur-
ity for the loan's repayment; the borrower did not receive the use
of the full sum on which interest was being charged.
However, the court in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v.
Shipp'0 4 reached a contrary result. There, plaintiff bank made
loans but withheld 10 percent from the loans as "compensating bal-
ances." Such sums were deposited in the bank (in a non-interest-
bearing account) to the credit of the borrower but could not be
withdrawn without the consent of the bank. The court held that
the loan was not usurious; the compensating balances were the
property of the borrower and, as security for the loan, could be liq-
uidated to pay the indebtness. Thus, the compensating balances
were not deducted from the face amount of the loans for the pur-
pose of determining the actual interest rate.
The last case clearly appears to be out of line with the general
rules in the United States that (1) interest is computed on the net
funds made available to the borrower and (2) the lender will be
held responsible (in determining whether usury exists) for any
unusual benefit obtained from a collateral transaction.
Delay in Delivery of Principal to Borrower. If the delay is in-
advertent and the lender volunteers to correct for the overcharge of
interest, generally the courts will find that there is no usury.10 5 On
the other hand, if the scheme of payment is such that the total loan
is not delivered, interest will be computed on the net proceeds made
available to determine usury.10 6
103. Id. at 599.
104. 205 So. 2d 101 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
105. Mlindlin v. Davis, 78 So. 789 (Fla. 1954); Shaffran v. Holness, 93 So.
2d 94 (Fla. 1957).
106. Penziner v. West American Finance Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 74 P.2d 252
(1937).
Statutes Describing More Than One Legal Rate. Most usury
statutes distinguish between written contracts where interest is
specified and other obligations where it is unspecified. A problem
arises in written contracts where the interest is unspecified, and
where the effective rate is in excess of the maximum rate pre-
scribed by statute for oral contracts. In Orlando v. Berns,107 the
contract was in writing but purported to be a sale. The court found
the contract to be a loan but applied the rate applicable to written
contracts. Thus, in California, if the contract is in writing, interest
need not be specified in order to apply the maximum rate (10 per-
cent). The law in other states may depend upon the specific lan-
guage of the statute.
5. A Description of Certain Loan Transactions Involving Interest
Charges Outside the Scope of Usury.
Certain loans, although involving charges which may or will be
deemed interest, are outside the scope of usury. Several exam-
ples are explained below.
The Lender's Recovery is Subject to Special Hazards. -Suppose
that the loan transaction provides that the lender is to receive as a
part (or all) of his interest for the loan a share in the profits or
rents from the property of the borrower. If the potential recovery
to the lender may exceed the legal maximum interest rate, the
transaction will be usurious unless the recovery is subject to sub-
stantial contingencies or hazards.
The principle is set forth in the Restatement of Contracts.108
Where the promise (made in consideration of a loan) is conditioned
upon a contingency that may provide the lender with a profit in
excess of the maximum statutory limit, the loan is not usurious if
the repayment would be materially less than the maximum statu-
tory limit if the contingency did not occur.
In a recent California case, Tommassen v. Carr,10 9 the lender
made a very speculative loan to a real estate speculator who was in
poor financial condition. The loan was subordinated to a construc-
tion loan. The lender was to receive in return for his loan, repay-
ment of all principal plus 30 percent of the net profits from the op-
eration and sale of the property. The lender also obtained an
opinion from prominent legal counsel that the loan was not usuri-
ous. The court held that the loan was not usurious, reasoning that
107. 154 Cal. App. 2d 753, 316 P.2d 705 (1957).
108. RESTATEMENT Or CONTRACTS, § 527 (1932).
109. 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 58 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1967).
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the venture was extremely speculative and the lender was taking a
real gamble that he would recover nothing more than the princi-
pal. As it worked out, he ultimately recovered interest in excess
of the maximum (10 percent) usury limit.
In American Insurers v. Regenold,110 the lender made a loan for
$18,000 secured by land worth twenty times that amount. In addi-
tion to repayment of principal, he was to receive six percent interest
plus one-half of the net profits on the sale of the land. The loan was
negotiated under circumstances of extreme need, and the court
found that a large profit on the sale of the land was reasonably
certain. It further found that no special hazard existed. The
court stated that if the probability of the contingency of loss is re-
mote, or if it does occur, the diminution of the profits is slight as
compared to the possible profit, the loan is usurious."
In summarizing the Tommassen and American Insurers cases, it
appears that the court weighs the upside risk of gain versus the
downside risk of loss measured from the point of the maximum
legal interest rate limitation in the particular jurisdiction.
Suppose that the contingency is a cost-of-living index applied to
the principal. Would it make any difference whether adjustments
were upwards only?"1
Once Non-Usurious, Always Non-Usurious. Numerous cases cite
the principle that if the loan transaction is non-usurious at its in-
ception, it will remain non-usurious under all circumstances (ex-
cept for an amendment of the agreement). The principle is illus-
trated by two cases.
In Penzer v. Foster,"3 the debtor allowed the loan to go into de-
fault for a substantial period of time. The note was non-usurious
at its inception and would have remained so had the debtor com-
plied with its terms. However, when the interest was compounded
after default (pursuant to the agreement) the interest recovered ex-
ceeded the aggregate maximum recovery allowed by the usury
statute for the life of the loan. The court held that the loan was
110. 243 Ark. 906, 423 S.W.2d 551 (1968).
111. See also, Jameson v. Warren, 91 Cal. App. 590, 267 P. 372 (1928);
Martyn v. Leslie, 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58 (1955); Maze v. Sycamore
Homes, 230 Cal. App. 2d 746, 41 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1964).
112. See 18 HAsT. L.J. 973 (1967).
113. 170 Cal. App. 2d 106, 338 P.2d 533 (1959).
non-usurious, reasoning that a loan which was non-usurious at its
inception could not be made usurious by the default of the bor-
rower.
In Mong v. Bass,114 the lender made a profit upon the sale of
repossessed vehicles which the trustee in bankruptcy for the bor-
rower claimed was additional interest for purposes of determining
usury. The court held, however, that the transaction was not
usurious. The court stated"15 that in order for the contract to be
usurious, it must require the payment of usury at its inception.
The debtor cannot subject his credit to the penalties of the usury
laws by his voluntary default in respect to the obligation where
there was no violation of the law present at the inception of the
contract.
C. Wrongful Intent.
The third element of usury is that there must be an intention by
the lender to exact an illegal charge. Where the agreement is
clearly usurious on its face, the intention to violate the law is "con-
clusively presumed." It is sufficient that by the terms of the con-
tract the lender was willing to accept more interest than the law
allows."16 Further, usurious intent is established by the amount of
interest the borrower has agreed to pay-not what he has actu-
ally paid.117
There are two situations where the general rule (that is, that
usurious intent is conclusively presumed) does not apply. The first
situation pertains to the agreement which is unclear on its face or
which does not purport to be a loan. There, the court will make a
finding that usurious interest was present.118 The second situa-
tion pertains to the transaction where there has been (1) a bona
fide error or miscalculation, (2) a minimum of damage, and (3)
a rectification of the situation upon discovery. In the second situ-
ation, some courts have indicated that there is no usurious intent.10
Ei.
EXEMPTIONs FROM TiE UsuRy LAWS
Certain major areas are frequently exempted by the laws of the
114. 248 Cal. App. 2d 377,56 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1957).
115. Id. at 384, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
116. Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 425, 269 P.2d 132 (1954).
117. Wood v. Angeles Mesa Land Co., 120 Cal. App. 313, 7 P.2d 748 (1932).
118. Maze v. Sycamore Homes, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 746, 41 Cal. Rptr.
338 (1964).
119. Shaffran v. Holness, 93 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1957). See Prather, supra
note 28 at 196; RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 537 (1932).
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various states from the application of usury. Important areas dis-
cussed in this part III are: (A) the corporate borrower exemption,
(B) the business purpose exemption, (C) FHA loans, and (D) the
purchase money exemption. A fifth major area to be discussed is
the special treatment frequently provided for banks and savings
and loan associations (see Part IV below).
A. The Corporate Borrower Exemption.
The most important and prevalent exemption to the usury laws
deprives corporate borrowers of the defense of usury on a transac-
tion otherwise subject to the usury laws. The exemption (found
in 32 states)120 appears in different forms. In some states, as New
York,'121 the corporation is merely denied the defense of usury.
In some states the law applies different maximum rates to individ-
uals and to corporations. In a third group of states, there is ab-
solutely no interest limitation applied to corporations. And in a
fourth group of states, the corporate borrower exemption applies
only if the loan exceeds a certain amount.122
Suppose that the lender (in order to make a loan) requires the
borrower to incorporate solely for the purpose of avoiding the
usury laws. Will the court pierce the corporate veil to find that
the borrower was (in fact) an individual (that is, the shareholder)?
There is a split in the decisions.
In New York, it makes no difference that the borrower was re-
quired to form his corporation solely to avoid the usury laws. 23
However, in the leading case of Jenkins v. Moyse, 2 - the court in-
dicated that the lender could not agree to make the loan to the in-
dividual and then use the corporation to conceal the usurious
transaction. The lender would have to take the position from the
beginning of negotiations that the loan would be made only to a
corporation.
In New Jersey and Florida, on the other hand, if the lender re-
quires the debtor to form a corporation for the sole purpose of act-
120. See Addendum infra.
121. N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1964).
122. See Addendum infra.
123. Leader v. Dinkler Management Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 393, 230 N.E.2d 120
(1967).
124. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
ing as the borrower, the courts will pierce the corporate veil, hold-
ing that the individual (shareholder) is the borrower.12  It also
appears that the courts in Arizona may question whether the bor-
rower was a viable corporation created by the borrower for a pur-
pose other than to avoid the application of the usury laws.1 26
B. Business Purpose Exemption.
The second exemption (applicable in at least three states) ex-
empts loans made "for a business purpose" from the usury laws. 27
Each state which may subsequently adopt the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code as presently drafted also will exclude business or com-
mercial loans.128
C. FHA Loan Exemptions.
Statutes in at least twenty-six states exclude FHA insured loans
from the application of the usury laws.12 9
D. Purchase-Money Credit Obligations.
Most usury statutes in the United States generally have been pat-
terned after the Statute of Anne, requiring that there be a loan or
forbearance. 30 Thus, if the debt obligation arose out of a purchase
and sale, rather than a loan or forbearance, many courts have ruled
that the usury laws do not apply. The justification for the exemp-
tion is that, unlike the loan or forbearance, a sale does not normally
involve a necessitous borrower in the hands of a rapacious lender.13'
To determine whether the exemption may apply in any particu-
lar state, the respective usury statute should be examined. For
instance, the Iowa statute applies the law of usury to "any contract
founded upon any sale or loan of real or personal property."' -2 In
states broadening the coverage of their usury laws beyond the loan
125. In re Greenberg, 21 N.J. 213, 121 A.2d 520 (1956); Atlas Subsidiaries
v. 0. & 0. Inc., 166 So.2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
126. Gangadean v. Flori Investment Co., 11 Ariz. App. 512, 466 P.2d 63
(1970). For a good article on this subject see Hershman, Usury and the
Tight Mortgage Market-Revisited, 24 Bus. LAWYER 1121 (1969) (herein-
after cited as Hershman].
127. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (Supp. I, 1970); ANN. COD OF Mn. art. 49,§§ 1-11 (Replacement Vol., 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 41, 46, 50 (Supp.
1968).
128. See Hershman, supra note 126 at 1121-25.
129. See Prather, supra note 28 at 193.
130. WILLISTON, supra note 6, § 1682 at 4754-55 (Rev., 1958).
131. Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945); GMAC v.
Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924).
132. IowA CoD ANN. § 535.4 (1962).
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or forbearance, the usury laws may be applied to debt obligations
arising out of purchases and sales.
Even in states applying the purchase-money exemption to the
usury laws, cases should be distinguished where the purchase-
money credit obligation (subject to the exemption) is altered,
amended, or extended by a subsequent agreement. In London v.
Toney,13 3 the parties entered into a credit sales transaction. Sub-
sequently, for a fee, the seller extended the time of payment of the
mortgage debt. The court held that the subsequent transaction
was a new agreement (constituting a forbearance) and was sub-
ject to the usury laws.
Definition of Purchase Money Credit Obligation. Since the ex-
emption applies to purchase and sale transactions, the cases have
limited the exemption to purchase money credit obligations.
3 4
Purchase money has been defined as the monies paid by the ven-
dee to the vendor in payment of the purchase price of property.
It includes the down payment, as well as the debt, if any, payable
to the vendor arising out of the purchase transaction. 35 The por-
tion of the purchase price other than the down payment is the
purchase-money credit obligation.
Although the purchase-money obligation may be in the name of
the seller, the situation should be examined when the financing is
furnished by a third party. As an example, suppose the seller of
an automobile takes back the security agreement or conditional
sales contract arising out of the sale, but he immediately sells or
discounts it to a finance company pursuant to a pre-arranged agree-
ment. In Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler,3 6 the buyer argued
that the seller was the agent of the finance company and that usury
should apply. The court found that no such agency existed but it
did not indicate that the theory of agency was not available.
Suppose that A Corp. sells property to a buyer and the sale is fi-
nanced by B Corp. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of A Corp.). The
vendor did not itself extend credit, and the credit obligation runs
from the buyer to B Corp. It would appear that if A Corp. and B
133. 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934).
134. Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal. 557, 261 P. 1017 (1927).
135. Eyster v. Hathaway, 50 Ild. 521, 99 Am. Dec. 537 (1864); Heuisler
v. Nickum, 38 Md. 270 (1873).
136. 124 Neb. 514, 247 N.W. 429 (1933).
Corp. elected to do business in the manner herein described, they
must take the consequences with the benefits. It appears likely
that the debt obligation arose out of a loan (made by B Corp.),
rather than the sale (by A Corp., the parent), and the law of usury
would apply.
Application of the Purchase-Money Credit Exemption. Virtually
all states having statutes patterned after the Statute of Anne fol-
low the general rule that it makes no difference that the sales price
on a credit sale exceeds the cash-sales price.137 A seller may
charge one price if the sale is for cash and a higher price if the sale
is upon credit. The difference between the two prices is not rele-
vant to the issue of usury since the courts indicate that usury does
not apply to a credit obligation arising out of a purchase and sale
transaction.
Suppose, however, that the purchase money credit obligation
calls for the payment of interest in excess of the statutory limit, or,
due to the manner in which the contract is drawn, it is clear that
the sales price includes such an interest charge. There is a split of
decisions as to whether usury applies to the transaction.
The leading case in California is Verbeck v. Clymer.18 In that
case, P sold land to D for $20,000, D paid $5,000 down and was to
pay the balance ($15,000) in monthly payments of $200 for 180
months. Even though the seller clearly was charging interest in
excess of California's usury limit, the court held that California's
usury law did not apply for the reason that the credit obligation
was a purchase-money trust deed note. Thus, in California it makes
no difference that the interest charged by the seller on a purchase
money credit obligation exceeds the legal rate.189
In other states, however, the courts have treated the credit-sale
agreement and the debt obligation as two separate obligations, re-
gardless of the fact that they are integral parts of the same agree-
ment. As an example, see G.F.C. Corp. v. Williams.40 There, the
court stated that independent of the sales arrangement, if the fi-
nancing arrangement of the deferred balance includes an interest
137. Rose v. Wheeler, 140 Cal. App. 217, 35 P.2d 220 (1934); Wilson v.
J.E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188, 4 P.2d 537 (1931); Verbeck v. Clymer, 202 Cal.
557, 261 P. 1017 (1927); Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393,
260 P. 659 (1927); WiLUSTON, supra note 6 at § 1685.
138. 202 Cal. 557, 261 P. 1017 (1927).
139. For a similar holding, see Wilson v. J.E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188,
4 P.2d 537 (1931); and Atlas Securities Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393,
260 P. 659 (1927).
140. 231 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App., 1950).
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charge in excess of the legal limit, the transaction is usurious.14'
At the present time, the law in the State of New York (as evi-
denced by lower court decisions) appears to be in conflict. In
Congress Financial Corp. v. Patti,142 the court held that the usury
law did not apply to a credit-sales transaction, regardless of what
interest rate may be charged. On the other hand, in Raben v.
Overseas Barters, Inc.,143 and in Mandolino v. Fribourg,'44 the
courts held that the extension of credit in a credit sale constituted
forbearance, and the usury laws applied.
In the Raben case, the court analogized the situation to the case of
London v. Toney. 45 However, in that case, there was a true for-
bearance because subsequent to the credit-sales transaction, the
parties entered into a new agreement extending the time of pay-
ment of the debt in exchange for a fee.
There appears to be no justification in holding that the deferred
balance is an independent obligation (constituting a forbearance)
which is subject to usury. In fact, a California court has expressly
held that there is no forbearance under the circumstances. 4 6 If
the transaction is exempt because it involves a credit sale, rather
than a loan or forbearance, then it should make no difference that
the credit sale also calls for the payment of interest in any amount.
In states where the lender's credit obligation is deemed a forbear-
ance, the lender would merely have to raise the price of the credit
sale to compensate himself in the manner which he would other-
wise seek compensation by way of additional interest. It seems
that nothing is gained by the cases calling the credit obligation a
forbearance except a trap for the unwary.
The basis of excluding the credit sale from the usury laws is that
it does not involve the needy borrower and the rapacious lender.14 7
The bargaining power of the parties is on a more equal basis, and
they should have the freedom to negotiate the terms of the sale
141. For a similar holding, see GMAC v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68,
262 S.W. 425 (1924).
142. 26 App. Div. 2d 924, 274 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1966).
143. 55 Misc. 2d 618, 286 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
144. 29 App. Div. 2d 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1968).
145. 263 N.Y. 439, 189 N.E. 485 (1934).
146. Upton v. Gould, 64 Cal. App. 2d 814, 149 P.2d 731 (1944).
147. Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945); GMAC v.
Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924).
without limitation. The courts have indicated that a seller may
contract to sell his property at any price and upon whatever terms
he may obtain.148 To apply the usury law to any aspect of the
credit sale transaction will limit the terms of sale, including the in-
terest rate, upon which the parties might otherwise agree.
IV.
SPECIAL STATUTORY TREATMENT FOR BANKS AND
CERTAIN SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS
Banks and savings institutions frequently are singled out for pre-
ferred treatment. Examples are as follows:
In California, all banks and building and loan associations are
exempt from the usury laws.
1 4 9
In New York, if a non-institutional lender makes a usurious loan,
it is void. If a bank or savings institution makes a usurious loan, it
may recover the principal of the loan, but all interest is forfeited
and the lender is liable for double damages based on the interest ac-
tually received. 50
Because banks and savings institutions frequently obtain special
treatment as described above, other lenders may seek the benefit of
such special treatment by (1) purchasing loans from the bank or
savings institution, or (2) participating in the making of any such
loan. To examine the legal position of the parties, three possible
situations will be examined. For purposes of the illustration, it is
assumed that the applicable usury law exempts loans by any bank
or savings institution from its coverage. And except for such ex-
emption, the loans would be usurious. Those situations are:
Illustration One. An exempt lender makes the loan without re-
lying upon or contemplating a subsequent participation in the loan
by a non-exempt lender. Subsequently, the non-exempt lender
purchases all (or a portion) of the loan.
Illustration Two. The exempt lender and the non-exempt par-
ticipant jointly organize and commit to make the loan under cir-
cumstances in which the exempt lender is unwilling (alone) to
make the loan.
Illustration Three. The participant organizes the loan package
and submits it to the exempt lender. The exempt lender is to act as
148. Wilson v. J.E. French Co., 214 Cal. 188, 4 P.2d 537 (1931).
149. CAL,. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (1919); Larwood v. San Diego Federal
Savings & Loan Association, No. 237216 (S.D. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1960).
150. N.Y. Gu. OBLGATroNs LAw § 5-511 (McKinney 1964).
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tender for a fee solely, or primarily, to avoid the application of the
usury laws.
The liability for usury will be examined in two aspects, namely,
(1) the non-exempt participant's liability and (2) the exempt
lender's liability, and it is anticipated that the non-exempt lender
may purchase a substantial portion of the loan contract.
The Non-Exempt Participant's Liability.
In Illustration One, the loan is not usurious in its inception be-
cause it is made by an exempt lender. The issue is: Following the
purchase of the obligation (or of an interest therein) by a non-
exempt participant, does the accrual and payment of interest in ex-
cess of the legal limit to the participant constitute a violation of the
usury laws? There appears to be no case authority directly on
point.
In order to find liability on the part of the non-exempt lender,
one would have to assume that (subsequent to the purchase) the in-
terest paid to the participant is usurious. Assuming that there is
usurious interest, the assignee of the contract will be liable for the
usurious benefits he has received unless he is a holder in due
course. .5  Of course, one cannot be a holder in due course if the
obligation on its face calls for usurious interest or if the holder
(prior to his acquisition of the loan) otherwise learns that the loan
is usurious.
Under the circumstances of Illustration One, probably the better
view is that the interest paid to the non-exempt participant is not
usurious. Three arguments support the conclusion.
1. The purpose of the usury law is to protect the necessitous
borrower in dealing with the rapacious lender.152 The time at
which the usury law is intended to apply is at the inception of the
loan transaction. The point is illustrated by the situation where a
purchaser of property assumes a usurious loan made to the seller
and secured by the property. The purchaser cannot raise the de-
fense of usury because it is not available to him. He was not a
party to the transaction at the time that the usury law afforded its
151. Calimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950).
152. Cases cited at note 144 supra.
protection.1 53
In Illustration One, the non-exempt participant acquired the in-
terest in a loan that was theretofore exempt. He was not a party
to the transaction at its inception, and the policy of the usury law
would not be served by subsequently subjecting him to its penal-
ties. Viewing the other side of the coin, commerce (the sale of
notes and the flow of money) will be promoted by not applying
the usury law to the transaction.
2. There is considerable authority under other circumstances
that if a loan is non-usurious at its inception, it will remain non-
usurious for the life of the loan.154 Thus, upon the acquisition of
an interest in the loan by a non-exempt participant, the loan would
remain non-usurious even though the subsequent interest payments
exceeded the maximum statutory limit.
3. In an analogous situation, the Insurance Commissioner ob-
tained an opinion from the Attorney General of the State of Cali-
fornia on the issue of whether an insurer could take as an assignee
a promissory note given by the insured to a bank to finance the
payment of an insurance premium. The interest rate charged by
the bank was in excess of the usury limit. The Attorney General
rendered his opinion that the usury laws of the State of California
would not be violated.155
It would appear that the Attorney General's opinion is based on
sound law, provided that there is a valid transaction between the
borro*er and the bank. The effect of the opinion is questioned,
however, if the bank's usury exemption is used merely to obtain
interest in excess of the maximum legal limit for the benefit of the
non-exempt participant.
Summarizing the arguments in respect to Illustration One, al-
though there is no authority directly in point, it would seem that if
a non-exempt lender obtains a participation in the loan under the
circumstances stated, the loan is not usurious.' 56
In Illustration Two, the non-exempt lender participates directly
153. Read v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 11 Cal. App. 2d 137, 53 P.2d 377
(1936).
154. Penzner v. Foster, 170 Cal. App. 2d 106, 338 P.2d 533 (1959); Mong
v. Bass, 248 Cal. App. 2d 377, 56 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967).
155. 50 Op. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 110 (1967).
156. The contrary proposition is not true, however. Where the bank
purchased two usurious notes from a non-exempt lender, the loans being
void under Nebraska law at their inception, the court held that the notes
were void in the hands of the bank. Hills v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 370, 109
N.W.2d 739 (1961); Robertson v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 385, 109 N.W.2d 716
(1961).
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in making the loan. Whereas there appears to be no authority di-
rectly on point, probably the portion of the loan attributable to
the non-exempt lender, being that portion on which it earns in-
terest in excess of the maximum legal limit, would be usurious.
Since the usurious benefits are limited to those received by the
non-exempt lender, it would not appear that (a) the exempt lender
received usurious interest or (b) the non-exempt lender is li-
able for the interest received by the exempt lender.
In Illustration Three, it is clear that to the extent of the partici-
pation by the non-exempt lender, the involvement of the exempt
lender's name has been primarily for the purpose of avoiding the
usury law.
In Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida
Inc.157 a national bank made a loan with the obvious intention of
assigning a major portion of the loan to a state bank. The na-
tional bank's assets did not allow it legally to make a loan of the
size involved. The note was usurious, and if Florida law applied,
there was a loss of principal as well as interest. However, if fed-
eral law applied, damages were limited to double the interest ac-
tually received, and all other interest was forfeited. The state bank
argued that because the loan was made by a national bank, federal
law158 applied to determine the damages attributable to the state
bank's share of the loan. However, the court held that the national
bank was a mere conduit for the funds of the state bank and ap-
plied Florida law to determine the penalties resulting to the state
bank.
In summarizing the non-exempt lender's prospective liability un-
der Illustrations Two and Three, it is likely that the benefits de-
rived from the transaction by the non-exempt lender will be
deemed usurious.
The Exempt Lender's Liability.
In referring to the three illustrations, an analysis must now be
made regarding the liability of the exempt lender to the extent that
usury, if any, is involved. 59 Keep in mind that a common fact
157. 110 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
158. 12 U.S.C.A. § 86 (1945).
159. The analysis in this Article is limited to prospective civil liabil-
ity; aspects of potential criminal liability are not discussed.
assumed in all of the illustrations was that the applicable usury law
(such as that found in California 16 0) exempts loans of the lender
(bank or savings institution) from its provisions. Thus, the only
usury that can be involved is that which may accrue to the non-
exempt lender.
In California, it is clear that the exemption of lenders within the
specified class relates to all provisions of the usury laws.1' 1 Thus,
the exempt lender cannot be directly liable as a principal for re-
ceiving more interest than allowed by the usury law. However, it
must be determined whether the exempt lender can be vicariously
liable for the activities of the non-exempt lender in receiving usuri-
ous interest.
Referring back to the illustrations, the conclusion in reference
to Illustration One was that there was no usurious interest in-
volved. However, in the latter two illustrations, the law probably is
to the contrary. The latter illustrations also raise the issue of
whether the exempt lender is liable as a partner, joint venturer,
agent or conspirator with the non-exempt lender.
As was pointed out in Clarke v. Horany,1 2 usury is a statutory
devise and liability can be imposed only by the express language
of the statute. In that case, the court held that a defendant (agent)
was not liable for usurious interest because the California statute
did not impose liablity on an agent, abettor, or conspirator of the
offending creditor.163
However, the California statute does place vicarious liability on
partners of the individual responsible for the loan, regardless of
whether the partner participated in making the loan.0 4 Thus, if
the court found that the two lenders were partners or joint ven-
turers, it is possible that the exempt lender might be vicariously
liable for the usurious interest paid to the non-exempt participant.
In summary, it appears that the exempt lender is not liable for
the usurious interest received by the non-exempt lender on the
basis that he was an agent of the non-exempt lender or a co-con-
spirator to exact usurious interest for the benefit of the non-exempt
lender. However, if the facts indicate that the two lenders are
partners or joint venturers, the exempt lender could be liable for
the usurious interest collected by the non-exempt lender.
160. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (1919).
161. Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
162. 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963).
163. For a similar holding see Penziner v. West American Finance Co.,
10 Cal. 2d 160, 74 P.2d 252 (1937).
164. Caimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950).
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V.
SPEcI SrUATIONS
In utilizing the principals previously outlined in this article,
lenders, on occasion, have attempted to avoid or circumvent the
usury laws by (A) entering into a purchase and sale with a lease-
back and option, or (B) deriving an unusual benefit out of a col-
lateral transaction. Each of these areas will be examined.
A. Purchase and Sale.
Frequently, a transaction is couched in terms of a purchase and
sale with an accompanying lease-back and option or obligation of
the seller to repurchase the property at some time in the future.
Because of the manner in which the transaction was set up, the
court has found that no purchase and sale was ever intended; that,
in fact, the parties used the language of a purchase and sale to dis-
guise a loan. Three cases illustrate the point.
In Martyn v. Leslie,16 5 defendants loaned money to plaintiff at
6 percent interest. In addition, defendants purchased a 15 percent
interest in plaintiffs television shows for $500. At the same time,
defendants granted plaintiff an option to repurchase the interest for
$8,000. Two independent parties were required to execute a guar-
antee that if plaintiff did not exercise the option the guarantors
would buy the portion of the business subject to the option for
$8,000. The court held that the transaction was a loan and the
difference between the fair market value of the option and the
actual value of the business was additional interest for purposes of
the usury statute.
In Orlando v. Berns,6 6 defendants purchased property from plain-
tiff for $178,000, also granting to plaintiff an option to repurchase
the property for $200,000. The actual fair market value of the prop-
erty conveyed to defendants was $292,000. The court held that
the transaction was a loan after determining that the sale and op-
tion prices had no relation to the fair market value of the property;
thus, the parties could not have intended the transaction to be a
purchase and sale.
165. 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58 (1955).
166. 154 Cal. App. 2d 753, 316 P.2d 705 (1957).
In Golden State Lanes v. Fox,167 defendant purchased a leasehold
estate from plaintiff for $150,000. The cash was placed in a joint
account to pay for improvements to the property. Plaintiff then
subleased the premises for eight years and agreed to repurchase
premises at the end of eight years for $150,000. The repurchase
was guaranteed by two individuals. In discussing whether the
transaction constituted a sale or a loan, the court stated that a
sale is the transfer of property for a price. The transfer is the es-
sence of the transaction. The transfer is general and absolute in
nature. A loan, on the other hand, is the delivery of money under
a contract to return it at a future time. The court found that the
parties entered into a loan transaction.
In conclusion, the court in each of the three cases readily looked
through the form to reach the substance, finding that the parties
had actually entered into a loan agreement. The court thereupon
applied the law of usury. It is clear, also, that in determining
whether usury is present in such cases, the courts ignore the
parol evidence rule and (where necessary) have held that the rule
is inapplicable.168
B. Benefits Derived from Collateral Transactions.
The parties to a loan agreement may enter into a collateral
transaction, possibly to accomplish some function complementary
to the loan. For instance, where flooring financing or a loan is ob-
tained by a merchant, the party furnishing the monies may re-
quire the merchant to "discount" (that is, sell back) his paper
obtained from customers to the financing party. In such in-
stances, if the profit on the discount is unusually large, the court
may hold that the collateral advantage obtained constitutes ad-
ditional interest on the loan. 69
The Restatement of Contracts'70 describes a number of collateral
transactions where a collateral advantage, if abnormally large,
could constitute additional interest on the accompanying loan. For
instance, in conjunction with a loan, suppose (1) the borrower is
employed by the lender at an unusually low salary, (2) the bor-
rower is required to purchase shares of stock from the lender at an
167. 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 42 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1965).
168. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956 (1927);
Martyn v. Leslie, 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58 (1955); Abbott v.
Stevens, 133 Cal. App. 2d 242, 284 P.2d 159 (1955); Murphy v. Ablow, 123
Cal. App. 2d 853, 268 P.2d 80 (1954); Vee Bee Service Co. v. Household
Finance Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
169. Terry Trading Corp. v. Barsky, 210 Cal. 428, 292 P. 474 (1930).
170. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 528 and Explanatory Notes (1932).
Usury Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
unusually high profit to the lender, (3) the borrower agrees to pur-
chase from the lender all of the goods he will require of a particu-
lar type for the following year or (4) the lender requires the bor-
rower to deposit a compensating balance (without interest) for the
benefit of the lender.
Suppose that an insurance company enters into a transaction
with a developer as follows: (1) the insurance company will pur-
chase the land from the developer and lease it back to him, nor-
mally at a rental based on a percentage of the cost of the land plus
a portion of the building rentals from the property; and (2) the in-
surance company will make the necessary long-term loan to finance
the development of the property. If the insurance company de-
rives an unusually high ground-rent (compared to competitive
ground rentals in the area), it is arguable that it has derived an
unusual collateral advantage attributable to the accompanying loan
for purposes of determining usury.
VI.
RIGHTS AND LIABrrms OF THE PARTES
Previously, this article has dealt with the rights and liabilities of
the principals involved directly in the transaction. Now the rela-
tionship of a number of other parties to the loan transaction will
be examined.
A. Right of Guarantors to Plead Usury.
The right of the guarantor to raise the defense of usury depends
upon the law applicable to the maker (borrower) in the same trans-
action. In states (such as California) where the defense of usury is
available to all borrowers, it is available to all guarantors. 171 On
the other hand, in states where the defense is not available to the
borrower, for example, a corporate borrower, it is not available to
the guarantor.17 2
B. Liability of Partners for Usury.
Partners are jointly and severally liable on loans made by one
171. Martin v. Ajax Constr. Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 425, 431, 269 P.2d 132,
135 (1954).
172. Cabrera v. Olsen, 165 Misc. 374, 300 N.Y.S. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
partner on behalf of the partnership. Where the loan was made
by one of several partners, all of the partners were liable for the
usurious nature of the transaction and it was not necessary that
they join in or ratify the loan.173 The theory on which the deci-
sions are based is that all three of the partners benefited from the
loan. 74
C. Liability of Officer or Director of Lender for Usurious Loan.
The defense of usury was not available at common law. Thus,
the right to assert usury arises only by statute.175 Under Cali-
fornia law, a director or officer who violates the usury law is per-
sonally liable for damages incurred by the corporation.7 6
D. Liability of Agent of Lender for Usury.
Since the defense of usury is strictly statutory, the language of
any applicable statute must be examined. Under the California
statute, the agent of the lender is not designated as a liable party;
thus, in California, the agent is not liable for the usurious loans of
his principal.1'77
E. Liability of an Assignee of a Note for Usury.
Where an assignee of the promisee's interest in a promissory
note has received usurious benefits, he will be liable for damages
unless he is a holder in due course in which event the original payee
is the proper party defendant. 78
F. Availability of Defense of Usury to Party Assuming Obliga-
tion.
Generally, a person who has purchased real property and as a
part of the purchase price assumed and agreed to pay an existing
encumbrance thereon is estopped to raise the defense of usury in
respect to the encumbrance. 7 9 However, suppose an accommoda-
173. Calimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421
(1950); Vee Bee Service Co. v. Household Finance Corp., 51 N.Y.S.2d 590
(Sup. Ct. 1944); Robertson v. Merwin, 154 App. Div. 713, 139 N.Y.S. 726
(1913).
174. However, since the law of usury is statutory, the result in some
jurisdictions may vary from that set forth above because of a strict inter-
pretation of the relevant usury statute.
175. Clarke v. Horany, 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 310-11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901,
904 (1963).
176. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1916-3 (West 1954).
177. Clarke v. Hornay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963).
178. Calimpco, Inc. v. Warden, 100 Cal. App. 2d 429, 224 P.2d 421 (1950).
179. Read v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 11 Cal. App. 2d 137, 53 P.2d 377(1936).
Usury Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tion party assumes the obligation with the consent of the lender in
such a manner that there is a novation (that is, the new party
actually is substituted for the original debtor). Under those cir-
cumstances, the new debtor would have the right to assert usury
in respect to the transaction. 8 0
G. Right of Junior Encumbrancer to Assert Claim of Usury.
Suppose that the person is merely a junior encumbrancer on cer-
tain property, and the usurious loan secured by a senior encum-
brance on the same property is in default. The person's only rem-
edy is to cure the default. He cannot raise the defense of usury nor




PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE UsuRY LAWS
One the violation is established, the court will be called upon to
impose the penalty. An understanding of the source, nature and
extent of such penalties includes: (A) an analysis of the source of
law applicable to the usury violation, (B) a determination of the
limitations on damages in usury cases, and (C) a determination of
the discretion in the trial court to vary the penalty within the stat-
utory requirements.
A. Source of Law Applicable to the Usury Violation.
Cases generally in the United States indicate that since there was
no usury at common law, the law governing usury is statutory. 8 2
Thus, resort is made solely to the applicable statute to determine the
penalties to be applied.
In all instances (except where the liable party is a national bank)
the law applicable in determining civil penalties is state law. As
can be seen from the Addendum following this article, there is a
180. Rodecker v. Littauer, 59 F. 857 (8th Cir. 1894); Plitt v. Kaufman,
188 Md. 608, 53 A.2d 673 (1947); Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 67 S.E.
754 (1910).
181. Barnes v. Hartman, 246 Cal. App. 2d 215, 54 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1966).
182. Clarke v. Hornay, 212 Cal. App. 2d 307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963);
Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida, Inc., 119 So.
2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
wide variation of penalties among the various states. In many
states, there is a forfeiture of all interest, while in other states the
lender forfeits either a multiple of all interest or the excess in-
terest. In several states there is a forfeiture of a percentage of
the principal plus all interest. Finally, a number of states pro-
vide for a forfeiture of all principal and interest.
The law applicable to national banks is federal law. Almost
without exception, it has been held that a national bank is subject
only to the penalties set forth in Section 86 of the National Bank-
ing Act.18 3 One exception to the general rule, however, is found in
the cases of Robertson v. Burnett'8 4 and Hills v. Burnett'"5 dis-
cussed earlier. There, a private lender made two usurious loans.
Under Nebraska law, the loans were void. Thus, when the private
lender sold those notes to the Michigan National Bank, the bank
acquired void obligations. The Nebraska court held that since
those notes were void at their inception, they also were void in the
hands of the bank. Thus, on the narrow fact situaton of those
two cases, state law determined the effective penalty applicable to
the national bank.
B. Limitations on Damages in Usury Cases.
Suppose that as a result of a particular usurious transaction, the
borrower suffered substantial consequential damages. Can the
borrower recover such damages solely on the basis that the dam-
ages resulted from the usurious charges?
The issue was covered in Coral Gables First National Bank v.
Constructors of Florida, Inc.'8 6 There, the court held that the
plaintiff could not obtain an award of consequential damages re-
sulting from a violation of the usury statute; that his only dam-
ages to which he was entitled as a result of the violation of the
usury statute were the penalties prescribed by statute. The court
pointed out that but for the usury statute, the loan was legal, in-
dicating that the subject of usury was one entirely of statutory reg-
ulations and prohibition.
Thus, it appears that the court can invoke no penalty on the
usurious lender other than that penalty prescribed by the appli-
cable statute.
183. 12 U.S.C.A. § 86 (1945); See 45 Am. Jun. 2d, Interest and Usury§ 308 (1969) for a discussion of usury penalties applicable to national
banks.
184. 172 Neb. 385, 109 N.W.2d 716 (1961).
185. 172 Neb. 370, 109 N.W.2d 739 (1961).
186. 119 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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C. An Analysis of the Discretion of the Trial Court to Vary the
Penalty Within the Statutory Requirement.
Historically, the courts have rigidly applied the provisions of the
applicable usury statute, levying on the usurious lender the full
statutory penalty. The defense of pari delicto has been expressly
held to be not available in usury cases.18 ' However, the courts in
two recent cases have indicated that the trial court has some discre-
tion in adjudging punitive damages.
In White v. Seitzman,188 the court indicated that the borrower
could be estopped from recovering all or a portion of his damages
where he had initiated the transaction. The court based its reason-
ing upon the theory of relative guilt.
In Golden State Lanes v. Fox,18 9 upon a retrial of the damages
issue, the trial court found that the lender was two-thirds guilty
and the borrower was one-third guilty, thereby rendering a judg-
ment to the borrower for double damages (instead of the treble
damages allowed by California law).
The policy of the law in all jurisdictions is to protect the bor-
rower. Where the borrower has been instrumental in engineering
the transaction, he should not be able to benefit therefrom, espe-
cially where he is the prime mover and dictates the terms.
187. Martyn v. Leslie, 137 Cal. App. 2d 41, 290 P.2d 58 (1955); Seebold v.
Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
188. 230 Cal. App. 2d 756, 41 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1964).
189. 232 Cal. App. 2d 135, 42 Cal.Rptr. 568 (1965).
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